Social status and crime by Arbak, Emrah
Social status and crime
Emrah Arbak
To cite this version:
Emrah Arbak. Social status and crime. Working Paper du GATE 2005-10. 2005. <halshs-
00180036>
HAL Id: halshs-00180036
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00180036
Submitted on 17 Oct 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL - WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
W.P. 05-10 
  
Social status and crime 
 
 
Emrah Arbak 
 
 
 
 
 
Novembre 2005 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
93 chemin des Mouilles – 69130 Écully – France 
B.P. 167 – 69131 Écully Cedex 
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
Messagerie électronique gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Serveur Web : www.gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
 
Social status and crime
Emrah Arbak∗
November 4, 2005
Abstract
We consider a large population of agents choosing either to engage in
a criminal activity or working. Individuals feel varying degrees of self-
reproach if they commit criminal acts. In addition, they are concerned
with their social status in society, based on others’ perceptions of their
values. In making their decisions, individuals weigh both the material and
social risks of being a criminal and a worker. We ﬁnd that introducing
social status concerns may induce multiple equilibria. We also consider the
implications of intragroup and intergroup interactions in an economy with
two classes of earning abilities. Typically, there is more crime in the low
ability group and increasing punishment reduces crime, but the opposite
may also be true.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D82, K42, Z13
Keywords: Crime, social identity, asymmetric information, behavioral
game theory.
∗GATE — Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (CNRS, Université Lyon 2, Ecole Nor-
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1. Introduction
Until recently, economic analysis of crime has focused only on the material risks
associated with illegal activities. Although many researchers are quick to note that
internal motives such as guilt, virtue, shame, and moral values are also inﬂuential
in criminal behavior, most work has focused on how extrinsic incentives deter or
encourage criminal activities. The decision to focus only on material interests
may be justiﬁed by the fact that incentives such as the probability of arrest,
the severity of punishment, earning ability, etc., are much easier to measure and
identify than internal motives. Moreover, if the variation of crime rates across time
and space were attributable to a large extent to diﬀerences in sentence lengths,
police expenditures, and other relevant socio-economic factors, there would be
little need to discuss unobservable internal motives that have little impact on
individuals’ decisions.
Recent empirical research, however, has shown that observable attributes can
explain only a small portion of the wide variation of crime. In this paper, we
identify two related internal motives. We presume that individuals are born with
a publicly unobservable propensity to feel self-reproach, or guilt, after committing
an illegal act.1 For our purposes, these sentiments determine an individual’s
personal ethical and moral values. In addition, we presume that individuals are
also concerned about how they are perceived by others.2 Being perceived as an
individual with a low level of guilt is embarrassing or shameful and thus induces
a loss of social status. We interpret these two motives as an individual’s private
and public types, the latter being a function of her observable actions. Therefore,
in our model an individual with a low propensity of guilt may nevertheless choose
not to be engaged in illegal activities in order to maintain her social status, or
to avoid embarrassment. In other words, if individuals are suﬃciently concerned
about their social status, they may be inclined to act ”as if” they are moral.
Our discussion is based on the seminal paper by Bernheim [3] and Bénabou
and Tirole [2], in which actions signal an individual’s personal attributes and
therefore aﬀect her status in the society.3 Unlike Bernheim [3], however, we
1See Kaplow and Shavell [8] for a model that considers the optimal use of guilt and virtue
in detering crime. Also, see Conley and Wang [4] for a model in which agents diﬀer from one
another with respect to their exogenously given levels of earning ability and ethical value.
2Our discussion is similar to the psychological games framework introduced by Geanakoplos,
Pearce, and Stacchetti [6].
3Alternatively, one could imagine that social status is directly dependent on individual’s
(observable) actions. See, for example, the model of Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull [9], in
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introduce an additional complexity. Whether or not an individual has actually
engaged in a criminal act is private information and therefore does not determine
an individual’s status. Instead, in our context, an individual’s status depends on
the publicly observable event of whether the individual was arrested or not.
Our approach is quite similar to Rasmusen’s [10] model of crime, in which
a convicted criminal suﬀers welfare losses not only as a consequence of material
penalties but also from stigmatization, i.e. others’ reluctance to interact with
the individual. Rasmusen [10] also considers conviction as the basis for being
stigmatized. However, in our model, the personal cost of being arrested is not the
economic opportunities foregone for that person, but rather the embarrassment of
being perceived as an immoral individual. We ﬁnd that introducing social status
concerns may induce multiple equilibria.
The extent to which an individual suﬀers public embarrassment also depends
on the class structure of the society and the way that social status is determined
within that structure. Consider, for example, a society in which individuals are
grouped according to their earning abilities. If criminal opportunities are identical
among the classes, then one would expect that crime would be more prevalent in
lower ability groups. However, if social status is determined within each group,
then one would expect that being arrested yields less social status loss in low
ability groups than in high ability groups.
Several papers have distinguished between the implications of local and ag-
gregate social interaction. In particular, Gleaser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [5]
consider a model where agents inﬂuence or are inﬂuenced by the actions of their
neighbors. The authors ﬁnd that these social interactions create enough covari-
ance across individuals to explain the high variance of crime rates among diﬀerent
neighborhoods. In particular, the authors ﬁnd that social interactions are quite
high in petty crimes, such as property crimes, larceny, etc. Also Sah [11] discusses
a model in which individuals formulate their likelihood of arrest by interacting lo-
cally. Our approach is quite distinct from these models, however, since we consider
rational individuals whose internal motives are shaped partially by their beliefs
about their social status. Allowing two groups with diﬀerent abilities, we ﬁnd that
when the social interaction is aggregate, there will be more criminals that belong
which welfare recipients incur costs of being observed as living on transfers. Note, however, that
such an approach may be a reduced form of Bernheim’s [3] model. In particular, being observed
as a welfare recipient may be interpreted as a signal of an underlying attribute. For example,
individuals may be concerned with their own ability to support themselves, which, in turn, may
be related to their earning ability, taste for leisure, or other fundamentals.
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to the low ability group. However, when there is only local interaction within a
group, there may be more crime in the high ability group than the low ability
group. Also, we ﬁnd that there are some cases in which increasing punishment
increases crime.
In the next section, we introduce a simple activity choice model and show
that concern for social status loss induces multiple equilibria. In section 3, we
introduce an aggregate relationship between work and crime. In section 4, we
allow the society to be comprised of two ability groups with a large number of
agents within each group and discuss the implications of intragroup and intergroup
interaction. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Simple model of crime
Consider an inﬁnite population of agents. The population size is normalized to 1.
Agents simultaneously decide whether to engage in an illegal activity (c = 1) or a
legal activity (c = 0). Let Uc ∈ R denote an individual’s utility from activity c. In
order to simplify our discussion, in the rest of the paper we assume that utilities
are in monetary terms and the agents are risk neutral. Individuals diﬀer from one
another with respect to the psychic cost/beneﬁt of engaging in the illegal activity,
which is denoted by γ ∈ R.
Suppose that γ is distributed by a continuous unimodal probability density
function φ with its mean and median at zero. Individuals with γ > 0 feel more
self-reproach, remorse, or guilt, than the average person in the population when
they engage in criminal activity. Individuals with γ < 0, however, may derive
some pleasure from the act of crime. In what follows, we assume that while γ is
private information, its distribution, φ, is public information. Also, let φ (γ) > 0
for all γ ∈ R.
If a criminal is arrested, she receives a punishment which costs her−f < 0. We
presume that the probability of arrest is given by a constant likelihood, α.4 Also,
suppose that only criminals are arrested. With these points in mind, individual
γ will choose the legal activity if and only if
U0 ≥ U1 − αf − γ. (2.1)
The equilibrium of the model will be described by the behavior of the marginal
person, that is, by
Γ ≡ U1 − U0 − αf, (2.2)
4Throughout the paper, we will assume that an arrest results in conviction.
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which will serve as a threshold that separates criminals from non-criminals. In
particular, all individuals below the threshold (γ < Γ) will choose to be criminals
and all individuals above the threshold (γ ≥ Γ) will choose to engage in the legal
activity.5 Also, the supply of crime, or the population proportion of criminals,
can readily be rewritten as a function of the threshold Γ,
K =
Z Γ
−∞
φ(γ)dγ. (2.3)
In the model described above, an optimal decision is ﬁnding the activity that
yields the greatest utility, keeping in mind the risks involved in committing an
illegal act. Our discussion thus far is an elementary version of Becker’s [1] criminal
choice model. In particular, for any Γ > 0, increasing punishment f or arrest rate
α will always reduce participation in illegal activities.
Individuals, however, may also be concerned with the stigma associated with
becoming a criminal. As in Bernheim [3], we assume that status depends on the
publicly perceived type of an individual, denoted by µ ∈ R, which is not neces-
sarily equivalent to the agent’s actual type γ. Unlike Bernheim’s [3] approach,
however, the public forms its perception about a speciﬁc agent based on the only
observation available to them: Whether the individual was caught or not.
In order to simplify our discussion, we suppose that the social status value,
s, of being perceived as a type µ individual is simply a linear function of the
individual’s concern for her social status, z ≥ 0, or
s (µ) = µz. (2.4)
In this social setting, if an individual is observed to have a low level of guilt,
µ < 0, then she will incur a status loss, s < 0. We assume that z is constant and
identical for all individuals. Now, deﬁne µa and µn as the two perceived types
based on the two events of being arrested and not being arrested, respectively. In
order to ease notation, let sa = s (µa) and sn = s (µn) .
It is important to emphasize the diﬀerence between social status and guilt.
Social status is not a personal attribute. It only describes an individual’s condi-
tion based on how she is perceived by others, which can be interpreted as being
embarrassed or feeling shameful. At best, µ is a perceived state, dependent on
observable outcomes. Guilt, on the other hand, is a personal attribute, which is
privately known and exogenously given.
5We assume that an individual will choose the legal activity if γ = Γ. Assuming otherwise
would not alter any of our results.
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With the social setting just described, individual γ will choose to engage in
the legal activity if her extended utility from activity 0,
U0 + s
n,
is no less than her extended utility from the illegal activity,
U1 + (1− α) sn − α (f − sa)− γ.
After rearranging, we see that an individual will choose to work if
U0 ≥ U1 − α (f + S)− γ,
where
S = sn − sa
denotes the net expected status loss of being arrested. Thus, a positive value
for S would imply that being arrested is costly, though we do not impose any
restrictions on the sign of S.
Each individual’s action depends on the social status, which in turn depends
on the behavior of others. As before, we can determine the threshold Γ which
separates criminals from others in equilibrium. Also, since only criminals are
arrested, the expected type of an arrested individual must simply be the average
type for criminals, or
µa =
R Γ
−∞ γφ(γ)dγ
K
. (2.5)
Note that µa < 0 and µa < Γ for all Γ.
The expected type of a ”seemingly innocent” individual, however, must con-
sider both non-criminals and successful criminals. Then, a random pick from the
population of individuals who were not arrested may either be a non-criminal,
which occurs with probability
1−K
1− αK.
or a successful criminal, which occurs with probability
K (1− α)
1− αK .
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We can thus write the expected type of an individual not arrested as
µn =
K (1− α)
1− αK ·
R Γ
−∞ γφ(γ)dγ
K
+
1−K
1− αK ·
R∞
Γ γφ(γ)dγ
1−K (2.6)
= − αK
1− αK · µ
a, (2.7)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the mean of φ is zero. By
rearranging and simplifying terms, we may now write the net expected status loss
as
S = (µn − µa) · z
= − µ
a
1− αK · z > 0, (2.8)
implying that being arrested is costly.
The equilibrium condition is thus
W (Γ) ≡ U0 − U1 + α (f + S) + Γ = 0. (2.9)
Our next result shows that for some given distribution, there may be multiple
equilibria for the simple model of criminal activity we have just described.
Proposition 2.1. There may be multiple equilibria. In particular, there exist
multiple equilibria for some distribution function φ and social status concern z > 0
if U1 − U0 − αf · G.
Proof. Note that there exists some small M− ∈ R such that for all γ < M−,
W (γ) < 0. Similarly, it is easy to show that there exists some large M+ ∈ R
such that W (γ) > 0 for all γ > M+. Therefore, if W (γ) = 0 then we must
have WΓ = dW/dΓ > 0 at equilibrium Γ.6 Otherwise, there must be multiple
equilibria.
We now show thatWΓ may be negative for some φ and (α, f) . First, note that
µaΓ =
Γ− µa
K
· φ(Γ) > 0.
6In what follows, a subscript Γ denotes a partial derivative with respect to Γ.
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Noting that KΓ = φ (Γ) , we write the partial derivative of W for Γ as
WΓ = 1 + αSΓ
= 1−
Ã
µaΓ (1− αK) + αµaφ (Γ)
(1− αK)2
!
· αz
= 1 +
Ã
µa−Γ
K
(1− αK)− αµa
(1− αK)2
!
· φ (Γ)αz (2.10)
= 1 +
Ã
(1− 2αK)µa − (1− αK)Γ
(1− αK)2
!
·
φ (Γ)
K
· αz. (2.11)
We ﬁrst show that when K < 1/2, the following inequality is correct:
(1− 2αK)µa − (1− αK)Γ < 0. (2.12)
Note that when the distribution φ is truncated to the right at Γ < 0, the mean
of the truncated distribution, which is µa, must be less than the median of that
distribution, implying that Z Γ
µa
φ (γ) dγ > K
2
.
Also, since φ is increasing for all Γ < 0, it is clearly the case that
(Γ− µa)φ (Γ) =
Z Γ
µa
φ (Γ) dγ ≥
Z Γ
µa
φ (γ) dγ.
We then have
(µa − Γ)φ (Γ) · −
Z Γ
µa
φ (γ) dγ · −K
2
,
or
µa · − K
2φ (Γ) + Γ. (2.13)
Similarly,
−Γφ (Γ) =
Z 0
Γ
φ (Γ) dγ ·
Z 0
Γ
φ (γ) dγ = 1
2
−K = 1− 2K
2
. (2.14)
We can now substitute (2.13) and (2.14) into equation (2.12) to get,
(1− 2αK)µa − (1− αK)Γ · (1− 2αK)
Ã
− K
2φ (Γ) + Γ
!
− (1− αK)Γ
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= −αKΓ− K
2φ (Γ)
=
K
2φ (Γ) · (−2αφ (Γ)Γ− 1)
·
K
2φ (Γ) · (−α (1− 2K)− 1) < 0.
The above argument can be used to show that if α < 1, then the (2.12) is
correct when K = 1/2. Therefore, there exists some upper bound G > 0 such
that
(1− 2αK)µa − (1− αK)Γ · 0,
for all Γ · G. Using equation (2.9), if z > 0 and U1−U0−αf · G, then Γ · G.
Having multiple equilibria diminishes our predictive power regarding the equi-
librium outcomes. It is, however, possible to reduce the number of equilibria since
not all equilibria are stable. Moreover, focusing on stable outcomes, we charac-
terize the sensitivity of our model to the policy variables. We ﬁrst introduce our
notion of stability and then apply it to analyze the sensitivity of the model.
If Γ is locally stable, then a small perturbation of the threshold around Γ
should initiate an adjustment which will end at Γ. Let us introduce t ≥ 0 as time
and Γ(t) as the process which converges to Γ. We assume that the solution path
is governed by the non-linear diﬀerential equation
Γ˙(t) = dΓ(t)
dt
≡ −k ·W (Γ(t)) , (2.15)
for some arbitrary speed of adjustment k > 0. In words, if individual γ = Γ(t)
would like to be a worker (criminal), or if W (γ) > 0 (W (γ) < 0), then equation
(2.15) requires that Γ˙(t) < 0 (Γ˙(t) > 0).
Lemma 2.2. The equilibrium is locally stable if and only if WΓ = dW/dΓ > 0.
Proof. We use a linear approximation of equilibrium dynamics to show that our
condition is necessary and suﬃcient to imply that equilibrium Γ is locally stable.
First, taking the linear approximation of equation (2.15) around Γ, we get
Γ˙ (t) = −k ·WΓ (Γ) · (Γ(t)− Γ)
for Γ(t) close to Γ. The previous equation and our concept of stability then imply
that Γ˙ and (Γ(t)− Γ) have to have opposite signs. Therefore, WΓ (Γ) > 0 has to
be true for local stability to be satisﬁed at Γ.
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The next result shows that crime varies negatively with the policy parameters
(α, f) or the social concern z.
Proposition 2.3. At a locally stable equilibrium, increasing the probability of
arrest, α, punishment, f , or social status concern, z, reduces crime.
Proof. Let W be deﬁned as above in equation (2.9). Stability implies that
WΓ > 0 at any equilibrium. Implicitly diﬀerentiating equation (2.9), we have
dΓ
df
= −Wf
WΓ
.
We know that Wf = α ≥ 0. Then, at any stable equilibrium, dΓ/df · 0, which
proves our result. To obtain the results for α and z, note that Wα = f + S > 0
and Wz = α (µn − µa) > 0.
3. Property crimes
In the previous section, we discussed a simple model of crime without considering
the aggregate relationship between crime and work. However, just as a criminal’s
earnings are uncertain whenever the probability of arrest is greater than zero, a
worker’s income is also uncertain simply because she may be robbed. Moreover,
having more criminals implies that there will be fewer workers and, therefore, less
income to be stolen. In this section, we investigate the aggregate relationship
between criminal and work activities within a model of social status.
Let y ≥ 0 denote the income that a worker can earn. In this section, we
assume that all individuals have the same earning ability, or that y is identical
for all agents. If she chooses to be a worker, an agent is required to commit a
constant amount of her time to work, which induces the psychic cost of g ≥ 0,
assumed to be common to all agents. We presume that engaging in the criminal
activity requires no eﬀort. Alternatively, we could assume that g gives the net cost
of working instead of being a criminal. As before, the individuals have personal
costs associated with crime, such as self-reproach, guilt, etc.
Criminal opportunities arrive randomly, as in I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert
[7]. In order to simplify matters, suppose that each criminal is randomly assigned
to another individual, implying that a criminal is unable to target her victim,
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and that a criminal may have the opportunity to rob at most a single worker.7
In addition, let us presume that no two criminals can both be assigned to the
same worker. Crime occurs only if a criminal victimizes a worker. Then, for
a criminal, the probability of being assigned to a worker is equivalent to the
population proportion of workers, 1−K, where K, the population proportion of
potential criminals, is deﬁned as
K =
Z +∞
−∞
c(γ)φ (γ) dγ, (3.1)
where c (γ) denotes the criminal choice of individual γ. Also, the population pro-
portion of criminals that are able to victimize a worker will be K (1−K) . Then,
the probability that a worker will be victimized equals to the population propor-
tion of criminals who victimize a worker divided by the population proportion of
workers, or K (1−K) / (1−K) = K.
If a criminal is assigned to some random worker, then she will attempt to steal
her entire income, y. Victimizing a worker does not guarantee that the criminal
activity results in a successful robbery. In our model, a criminal, and only a
criminal, can be caught. Again, let α be the probability that a criminal — who
has been able to victimize a worker — will be arrested. When a criminal is caught,
we assume that the victim is returned the entire stolen amount and the criminal
is charged a ﬁne of f ≥ 0. For a worker, the probability of being unharmed by
crime is given by the probability of not being victimized by a successful criminal,
1−K (1− α) . Similarly, the probability that a criminal will be successful is equal
to the joint probability that the criminal will be assigned to a worker and that
the crime is a success, (1−K) (1− α) . Let
U0 = (1−K (1− α)) y
U1 = (1−K) (1− α) y
denote an individual’s expected income from work and crime, respectively.
In order to illustrate the choice problem, let us imagine the two activities as
lotteries. Working results in three diﬀerent outcomes. The worker can lose her
income if a criminal is assigned to her and if the crime is a success, which occurs
with probability (1− α)K. Otherwise, if either the criminal is caught or if she
7A more complex model would also include opportunities to rob criminals, opportunities to
form organizations that specialize in criminal activities, etc. We do not consider these options
in this paper.
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(K) (1-K)
(Œ) (1-Œ)
y-g -g
y-g
work
(K) (1-K)
(Œ) (1-Œ)-?
crime
-f-? y-?
Figure 3.1: The two actions represented as lotteries.
is not victimized, the worker will be able to enjoy her entire income y. Engaging
in crime also leads to three outcomes. As discussed above, the criminal is able to
steal y if she is assigned to a worker and if the crime is successful. If she is not
assigned to a worker, then the criminal will earn nothing. Instead, if the criminal
is caught stealing, which occurs with probability (1−K)α, then she will return
the entire stolen amount8 and incur the punishment of f. The two decision trees
in Figure 3.1 depict the work and crime activities as lotteries.
With these in mind, an individual will choose to be a worker if her expected
utility from work, U0−g+sn exceeds her expected utility from criminal activities,
U1−α (1−K) (f − sa)+(1− α (1−K)) sn−γ. After rearranging, we can rewrite
type γ individual’s condition to work as
αy − g ≥ −α(1−K) (f + S)− γ, (3.2)
where S = (µn − µa) z represents the net expected social status loss of being
apprehended.
As before, we can determine the threshold Γ which separates criminals from
others in equilibrium. The expected type of an arrested individual must simply
be the average type for criminals, µa, as deﬁned in equation (2.5). An individual
who is not arrested, however, may either be from the population of workers or
from the population of criminals who are not arrested. The proportion of workers
among all individuals who are not arrested is given by the proportion of workers,
8Alternative formulations regarding whether a part of the stolen amount can be looted are
possible but do not change our result.
12
1 −K, divided by 1 − αK (1−K) , the population proportion of all individuals
who are not arrested. Similarly, the proportion of criminals among all individuals
who are not arrested is given by the population proportion of criminals who are
not arrested, K (1− α (1−K)) , divided again by 1− αK (1−K) . We can thus
write the expected type of an individual who is not arrested as
µn =
K (1− α (1−K))
1− αK (1−K) ·
R Γ
−∞ γφ(γ)dγ
K
+
1−K
1− αK (1−K) ·
R+∞
Γ γφ(γ)dγ
1−K ,
= − αK (1−K)
1− αK (1−K) · µ
a > 0. (3.3)
After rearranging, the net expected social loss S can be simpliﬁed to
S = − µ
a
1− αK (1−K) · z ≥ 0. (3.4)
Social status risk is closely related to the signaling capacity of the event of
being arrested. If the criminal is in an environment where many individuals with
above-average guilt (γ ≥ 0) are criminals, then the social status loss associated
with being caught will not be very dire.
Lemma 3.1. When threshold Γ increases, the expected status loss decreases, or
SΓ < 0.
Proof. The derivative of S with respect to Γ is
SΓ = −
(1− αK (1−K))µaΓ + α (1− 2K)µaKΓ
(1− αK (1−K))2 z, (3.5)
where
µaΓ =
ΓK − R Γ−∞ γφ(γ)dγ
K2
φ (Γ) =
µΓ− µa
K
¶
φ (Γ) > 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that Γ > µa by deﬁnition. Substituting
for µaΓ in (3.5), we can write
SΓ = −
(1− αK (1−K))
³
Γ−µa
K
´
+ α (1− 2K)µa
(1− αK (1−K))2 · φ (Γ) z
=
(1− αK(2− 3K))µa − (1− αK (1−K))Γ
K (1− αK (1−K))2 · φ (Γ) z · 0
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The last inequality follows from the fact that
(1− αK(2− 3K))µa − (1− αK (1−K))Γ < 0. (3.6)
To see this, note that for K = 1/2 it is an immediate consequence of Γ > µa.
Also, for K > 1/2, Γ > 0, which implies that (1− αK (1−K))Γ > 0, while
(1− αK(2− 3K))µa · 0.
Finally, to establish (3.6) for the case in which K < 1/2, we can use the two
inequalities (2.13 — 2.14) from Proposition 2.1 to get,
(1− αK(2− 3K))µa − (1− αK (1−K))Γ
· (1− αK(2− 3K))
Ã
Γ− K
2φ (Γ)
!
− (1− αK (1−K))Γ
= − (1− αK(2− 3K)) K
2φ (Γ) − αK (1− 2K)Γ
=
K
2φ (Γ) · (− (1− αK(2− 3K))− 2α (1− 2K)Γφ (Γ))
·
K
2φ (Γ) ·
³
− (1− αK(2− 3K)) + α (1− 2K)2
´
=
K
2φ (Γ) · (−(1− α)− αK(2−K)) < 0.
The previous result shows, as in the previous section, that if crime increases,
the social status loss associated with being arrested decreases. Therefore, as crime
increases, the social disincentives diminish, inviting the possibility of multiple
equilibrium. Our next result also conﬁrms our earlier ﬁndings about the existence
of multiple equilibria and that increasing the policy variables (α, f) reduces crime
at any stable equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. There may be multiple equilibria. Moreover, at any stable
equilibrium, increasing the punishment, f , the probability of arrest, α, or concern
for social status, z, reduces crime.
Proof. Individual Γ is, by deﬁnition, indiﬀerent between stealing and working:
W ≡ α (y + (1−K) (f + S))− g + Γ = 0.
14
In order to assess the eﬀect of raising f on the criminal population, we write
dΓ
df
= −Wf
WΓ
.
It is easy to show thatWf ≥ 0 such that increasing f causesW to become positive,
making work more preferable than crime.
WΓ = 1− α [(f + S)KΓ − (1−K)SΓ]
= 1− α
(Ã
f
z
− µ
a
1− αK (1−K)
!
− (1−K)
Ã
(1− αK(2− 3K))µa − (1− αK (1−K))Γ
K (1− αK (1−K))2
!)
· φ (Γ) z
Since SΓ · 0, the term in square brackets in the previous equation is positive.
Therefore, there exists some distribution φ suﬃciently dense around the center
and a suﬃciently large concern for social status z > 0 that ensure that WΓ < 0.
However, at any stable equilibrium, WΓ > 0, and thus dΓ/df · 0. To obtain
the results for α and z, note that Wα = y + (1 − K) (f − S) > 0 and Wz =
α (1−K) (µn − µa) > 0.
4. Diﬀerent ability groups
We have so far assumed that individuals diﬀer only with respect to their psychic
cost of engaging in crime, γ. Let us now generalize our discussion by considering
also diﬀerent ability types. In order to simplify the discussion, suppose that
there are two ability types, y = yH , yL, where yH > yL > 0. Let ri = 1 − rj
be the population proportion of ability type i = H,L. In our present setup, an
individual each individual is then described by (i, γ) . Lastly, we assume that the
psychic cost γ is distributed identically among the two groups and independently
from y.
Since a criminal is assigned to a random individual from the population, her
expected loot will now be
Y = rH(1−KH)yH + rL(1−KL)yL.
where the population proportion of criminals with ability i is deﬁned as
Ki =
Z Γi
−∞
φ(γ)dγ, (4.1)
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where Γi determines the threshold for group i = H,L. Also, the total population
proportion of criminals is now given by
K = rHKH + rLKL.
Our discussion in this section allows us to distinguish between two types of
social interaction mechanisms. In the previous sections, an individual’s social
status was dependent on how others perceived her preference type γ. Being per-
ceived as an individual with low level of self-reproach was costly since such an
event implied a social status loss. However, one may wonder if individuals within
a particular ability group really care how they are perceived by individuals from
another ability group. It is possible that ability types are observable, so that when
an individual is arrested, her expected type can be determined by the proportion
of criminals in her ability group. Both these assumptions lead us to distinguish
between intragroup interaction and intergroup interaction. Let Si and So denote
the net expected status losses for the intragroup interaction for ability group i and
intergroup interaction, respectively. We operationalize both types of interaction
by assuming that the net expected status loss for any individual with ability i is
given by σi as a convex combination of Si and So:
σi = βSi + (1− β)So,
where β ∈ [0, 1].
Let U0,i = (1− (1− α)K) yi and U1 = (1− α)Y be the expected incomes of
(i, γ) from work and criminals activities, respectively. Then, individual (i, γ) will
work if and only if her net utility from work, U0 − g, exceeds her net utility from
criminal activities, U1 − α (1−K) (f + σi)− γ, or if Wi ≥ 0 where
Wi = U0,i − g − U1 + α (1−K) (f + σi) + γ. (4.2)
When the social status is determined by intergroup interaction, the expected
type for arrested criminals, µa, is deﬁned, as before, to be the expected type of
criminals. However, we now consider two groups of individuals. The probability
that an arrested individual has ability i is simply the proportion of criminals
with that ability among all criminals, riKi/K. The expected preference type of a
potential criminal with ability i is deﬁned by
µai =
1
Ki
·
Z Γi
−∞
γφ (γ) dγ.
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Combining the two ability types, we may now write the expected type of a po-
tential criminal as
µao =
1
K
·
X
i=H,L
riKiµ
a
i =
1
K
·

 X
i=H,L
ri
Z Γi
−∞
γφ (γ) dγ

 . (4.3)
Similarly, the expected type of individuals who are not arrested, µn, can now
be written as a function of the expected types for both ability groups. However,
remember from our discussion in the previous section that individuals who are not
arrested can either be workers or criminals who were either unable to victimize
a worker or avoided being captured. Note, however, that unlike before we will
need to consider the expected type of workers and criminals within each ability
group, just like we did for the calculation of µao above. The probability that
an individual who is not convicted is from ability group i is equivalent to the
proportion of ability i individuals who were not arrested, 1−αKi (1−K) , divided
by the population proportion of non-convicted individuals, 1− αK (1−K) . The
probability that a random pick from the population of free individuals is a criminal
with ability i is equivalent to the proportion of ability i criminals who were not
arrested, Ki (1− α (1−K)) , divided by the population proportion of individuals
who were not arrested, 1− αK (1−K) . Since the entire population is comprised
of both type H and type L individuals, the expected type of an individual who
was not arrested, µno , will be determined by a weighted combination of proportions
of criminals and workers from both groups. More succinctly, the expected type of
an individual who was not arrested can now be simpliﬁed to
µno =
1− α (1−K)
1− αK (1−K) ·

 X
i=H,L
ri
Z Γi
−∞
γφ (γ) dγ


+
1
1− αK (1−K) ·

 X
i=H,L
ri
Z +∞
Γi
γφ (γ) dγ


= − αK (1−K)
1− αK (1−K) · µ
a
o. (4.4)
After rearranging the terms, we ﬁnd that the net expected social status loss for
the intergroup interaction model, So, can be simpliﬁed to the familiar form
So = (µ
n
o − µao) · z = −
µao
1− αK (1−K) · z. (4.5)
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Lemma 4.1. For any i, j ∈ {H,L} with Γi ≥ Γj, as the threshold for group i
increases, the net intergroup expected status loss decreases, or ∂So/∂Γi < 0.
Proof. The derivative of the expected type of a criminal is
∂µao
∂Γi
= ri ·
Γi − µao
K
· φ (Γi) .
The previous term is strictly positive for i but may be negative for j. Now, we
have
∂So
∂Γi
= −
∂µao
∂Γi (1− αK (1−K)) + αri (1− 2K ·Ki)µ
a
oφ (Γi)
(1− αK (1−K))2 · z
= −
Γi−µao
K
(1− αK (1−K)) + α (1− 2K ·Ki)µao
(1− αK (1−K))2 · rizφ (Γi)
= −(Γi − µ
a
o) (1− αK (1−K)) + αK (1− 2K ·Ki)µao
K (1− αK (1−K))2 · rizφ (Γi)
= −(1− αK (1−K))Γi − (1− αK (2 (1−KKi)−K))µ
a
o
K (1− αK (1−K))2 · rizφ (Γi) < 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that
(1− αK (2 (1−KKi)−K))µao − (1− αK (1−K))Γi < 0 (4.6)
To see this, note that when K = 1/2, the inequality is a direct consequence of
µao < Γi. When K > 1/2, Γi > 0 and therefore (1− αK (1−K))Γi > 0 while
(1− αK (2− 3K))µao < 0.
Finally, to establish (4.6) for the case in which K < 1/2, note ﬁrst that since
Γi ≥ Γj, we have −Ki · −K · −Kj and µai ≥ µao ≥ µaj . Then, we write the
following two inequalities, which are similar to their counterparts in equations
(2.13 — 2.14) in Proposition 2.1:
µao · µ
a
i · −
Ki
2φ (Γi)
+ Γi · −
K
2φ (Γi)
+ Γi
and
−Γiφ (Γi) ·
1
2
−Ki =
1− 2Ki
2
·
1− 2K
2
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Using the properties just outlined, we can establish the inequality in (4.6) when
K < 1/2 :
(1− αK (2 (1−KKi)−K))µao − (1− αK (1−K))Γi
· (1− αK(2− 3K))µao − (1− αK (1−K))Γi
· (1− αK(2− 3K))µai − (1− αK (1−K))Γi
· (1− αK(2− 3K))
Ã
Γi −
K
2φ (Γi)
!
− (1− αK (1−K))Γi
= − (1− αK(2− 3K)) K
2φ (Γi)
− αK (1− 2K)Γi
=
K
2φ (Γi)
· (− (1− αK(2− 3K))− 2α (1− 2K)Γiφ (Γi))
·
K
2φ (Γi)
·
³
− (1− αK(2− 3K)) + α (1− 2K)2
´
=
K
2φ (Γi)
· (−(1− α)− αK (2−K)) < 0.
We now introduce the intragroup interaction mechanism, in which concern for
status is determined within a group. Suppose that we pick a random agent from
the population of individuals who are not arrested. As was discussed previously,
that agent may be a criminal or a worker. In particular, the probability of pick-
ing a criminal from all ability i individuals is simply the proportion of ability i
criminals who were either not able to victimize a worker or who were not caught,
Ki (1− α (1−K)) , divided by the population proportion of ability i individuals
who were not caught, 1−αKi (1−K) .9 For the same ability group, the probabil-
ity of picking a worker, then, is simply the proportion of ability i workers, 1−Ki,
divided again by the population proportion of ability i individuals who were not
caught. The expected (preference) type of an ability i individual who was not
arrested is
µni =
Ki (1− α (1−K))
1− αKi (1−K)
·
R Γi
−∞ γφ (γ) dγ
Ki
+
1−Ki
1− αKi (1−K)
·
R+∞
Γi γφ (γ) dγ
1−Ki
= − αKi (1−K)
1− αKi (1−K)
· µai
9Note that 1−K still gives the probability that a criminal will be assigned to a worker.
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The expected (net) social loss in the event of being arrested for the intragroup
interaction model is then given by
Si = (µ
n
i − µai ) · z = −
µai
1− αKi (1−K)
· z. (4.7)
Our next result shows that increasing crime reduces the net expected social
status loss for the intragroup interaction model.
Lemma 4.2. For any i, j = H,L, as threshold Γj increases, the net intragroup
expected status loss for group i decreases, or ∂Si/∂Γj < 0.
Proof. First, we can easily show that
∂µai
∂Γi
=
Γi − µai
Ki
· φ (Γi) > 0.
Also, note that ∂µai /∂Γj = 0 for j 6= i. Now, we have
∂Si
∂Γi
= −
∂µa
i
∂Γi (1− αKi (1−K)) + α (1−K − riKi)µ
a
iφ (Γi)
(1− αKi (1−K))2
· z
= −
³Γi−µai
Ki
´
(1− αKi (1−K)) + α (1−K − riKi)µai
(1− αKi (1−K))2
· φ (Γi) z
= −(Γi − µ
a
i ) (1− αKi (1−K)) + αKi (1−K − riKi)µai
Ki (1− αKi (1−K))2
· φ (Γi) z.
=
(1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))µai − (1− αKi (1−K))Γi
Ki (1− αKi (1−K))2
· φ (Γi) z < 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that
(1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))µai − (1− αKi (1−K))Γi < 0 (4.8)
To see this, note that when Ki = 1/2, the inequality is a direct consequence of
µai < Γi. When Ki > 1/2, Γi > 0 and therefore (1− αKi (1−K))Γi > 0 while
(1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))µai < 0.
To establish (3.6) for when Ki < 1/2, we use the following inequalities already
outlines in the proof of Lemma 4.1:
µai · −
Ki
2φ (Γi)
+ Γi
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and
−Γiφ (Γi) ·
1
2
−Ki =
1− 2Ki
2
Using the properties, we can establish the inequality in (4.8) when Ki < 1/2 :
(1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))µai − (1− αKi (1−K))Γi
· (1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))
Ã
− Ki
2φ (Γi)
+ Γi
!
− (1− αKi (1−K))Γi
= − (1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))
Ki
2φ (Γi)
− αKi (1−K − riKi)Γi
=
Ki
2φ (Γi)
· (− (1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi))− 2α (1−K − riKi)Γiφ (Γi))
·
K
2φ (Γi)
· (− (1− αKi (2 (1−K)− riKi)) + α (1−K − riKi) (1− 2Ki))
=
K
2φ (Γi)
· (− (1− α)− αriKi (1−Ki)− αK) < 0.
Finally, when j 6= i, we can simply see that
∂Si
∂Γj
=
αrjKiµai
1− αKi (1−K)
< 0.
Since we have two ability groups, we have to modify our stability results.
In particular, our stability needs to ensure that perturbations will not start an
adjustment process away from the original equilibrium. Let
Γ(t) =
"
ΓH(t)
ΓL(t)
#
denote the two thresholds at any point in time t ≥ 0. As before, we let the
equilibrium dynamics be governed by the non-linear function
Γ˙(t) = DtΓ(t) ≡ −K ·W (Γ(t)) , (4.9)
where K is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements, ki, determine the speed
of adjustment for group i = H,L.
We now determine the conditions that guarantee that Γ is stable. Our next
result utilizes the decision functions WH and WL, as deﬁned in equation (4.2).
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Lemma 4.3. Let A be the Jacobian matrix for WH and WL, such that
A =
"
aHH aHL
aLH aLL
#
where aij = dWi/dΓj for any i, j ∈ {H,L}. Then, Γ is locally stable if
detA = aHH · aLL − aHL · aLH > 0 and aHH + aLL > 0.
Proof. The local stability of an equilibrium Γ is guided by a linear approximation
of (4.9), or by
Γ˙(t) = −K · A · [Γ(t)− Γ] .
We now apply the Routh-Hurwitz condition to determine the local stability
properties for some Γ. The characteristic equation for −A is given by
λ2 − (aHH + aLL)λ+ detA. (4.10)
Then, the Routh-Hurwitz condition implies that both aHH+aLL > 0 and detA >
0 have to be true in order to have Γ as a locally stable equilibrium.
Our next result shows that when the social status is determined by intergroup
interaction, then the low ability group has more crime than the high ability group.
This result is quite easy to interpret: Since criminals have access to both groups
for their criminal activities, increasing the income diﬀerential between the two
groups naturally leads to more crime in the low ability group. However, the same
result can not be obtained if social status is determined by intragroup interaction.
Proposition 4.4. The following results apply to stable equilibria.
i). When social status is determined by intergroup interaction, β = 0,
increasing punishment f reduces crime for the high ability group, but
may increase crime for the low ability group if the income dispersion,
yH − yL, is suﬃciently large. When β > 0, increasing punishment f
may increase crime for either group.
ii). When β = 0, there is less crime in the high ability group, i.e.
KH < KL. However, if β > 0, the high ability group may have more
crime than the low ability group.
iii). Increasing the intragroup interaction factor β may increase, de-
crease, or leave aggregate crime unchanged.
22
Proof. Before proving the results, we identify the properties of the elements of
the Jacobian matrix A. Then, we will use the Implicit Function theorem to obtain
local comparative statics.
The elements of A are given by
aii =
dWi
dΓi
= 1− α
Ã
ri (f + σi) · φ (Γi)− (1−K) ·
∂σi
∂Γi
!
aij =
dWi
dΓj
= − (1− α) (1− ri) (yi − yj) · φ (Γj)
−α
Ã
rj (f + σi) · φ (Γj)− (1−K) ·
∂σi
∂Γj
!
.
We ﬁrst show the sign of aHL−aLL. Note that by omitting the common terms
of aHL and aLL, we can write
aHL − aLL = −1− (1− α) (1− rH) (yH − yL) · φ (ΓL)
−αβ
Ã
rL (SH − SL)φ (ΓL)− (1−K)
Ã
∂SH
∂ΓL
− ∂SL∂ΓL
!!
.(4.11)
It is easy to see that if β = 0, then aHL − aLL < 0.
We now show that when β > 0 and α > 0, it is possible to have aHL−aLL ≥ 0.
Since µaH < 0 by deﬁnition, we know that
rL · SH · φ (ΓL)− (1−K) ·
∂SH
∂ΓL
= − rLµ
a
H
1− αKH (1−K)
· φ (ΓL) z
−αKH (1−K) rLµ
a
H
1− αKH (1−K)
· φ (ΓL) z
= −1 + αKH (1−K)
1− αKH (1−K)
· rLµ
a
H · φ (ΓL) z > 0
Similarly, we can show that
0 < (1−K) · ∂SL∂ΓL
− rL · SL · φ (ΓL)
=
(1− αKL (2(1−K)− rLKL))µaL − (1− αKL (1−K))ΓL
KL (1− αKL (1−K))2
· (1−K)φ (ΓL) z
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+
rLµ
a
L
1− αKL (1−K)
· φ (ΓL) z
=
((1−K) (1− αKL (2(1−K)− rLKL)) + rLKL (1− αKL (1−K)))µaL
KL (1− αKL (1−K))2
· φ (ΓL) z
− ΓL
KL (1− αKL (1−K))
· (1−K)φ (ΓL) z
=
(1− 2αKL (1−K (2−K))−K + rLKL)
KL (1− αKL (1−K))2
· µaL · φ (ΓL) z
− (1−K)ΓL
KL (1− αKL (1−K))
· φ (ΓL) z
< 0
where the inequality in the beginning of the previous arguments follows since
∂SL/∂ΓL < 0 by Lemma 4.2 and SL ≥ 0. To illustrate that the term in brackets
in equation (4.11) could be positive, let Γ = ΓH = ΓL = 0, which enables us to
let µ ≡ µaH = µaL and K = KH = KL = 1/2. In that case, we have
rL (SH − SL)φ (0)− (1−K)
Ã
∂SH
∂ΓL
− ∂SL∂ΓL
!
=
16− 8α+ rα2
(4− α)2 · µ · φ (0) z < 0.
Therefore, aHL−aLL ≥ 0 could be true for some distribution φ that is suﬃciently
dense around the center and a suﬃciently large concern for social status z > 0.
We now obtain the sign for aLH−aHH . After omitting common terms, we have
aHL − aLL = −1− (1− α) (1− rL) (yL − yH) · φ (ΓH)
−αβ
Ã
rH (SL − SH)φ (ΓH)− (1−K)
Ã
∂SL
∂ΓH
− ∂SH∂ΓH
!!
.
Note that when β = 0, if yL − yH is suﬃciently large, then it is possible that
aHL − aLL ≥ 0. When β > 0, we can use a similar argument as above to show
that the same aHL − aLL ≥ 0 is also possible.
We are now ready to prove our ﬁrst result. The Implicit Function theorem
implies that
−A−1 ·DfW = DfΓ
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where
DfW =
" ∂WH
∂f
∂WL
∂f
#
=
"
α (1−K)
α (1−K)
#
,
and
DfΓ =
" ∂ΓH
∂f
∂ΓL
∂f
#
.
By carrying out these operations, we get" ∂ΓH
∂f
∂ΓL
∂f
#
=
" α(1−K)(aHL−aLL)
detA
α(1−K)(aLH−aHH)
detA
#
.
Then, when punishment is increased, Γi decreases only when aij − ajj < 0.
In order to obtain our second result, we simply subtractWL fromWH in order
to omit common variables:
WH −WL = (1− α (1−K)) (yH − yL)
+αβ (1−K) (SH − SL) + ΓH − ΓL.
It is quite easy to see that β = 0 and yH − yL > 0 imply that ΓH − ΓL < 0.
However, when β > 0, it is possible to have ΓH − ΓL > 0. To see this, note
that SH − SL and ΓH − ΓL have opposite signs by lemma 4.2. Also, note that
neither of the stability conditions restrict the magnitude or sign of SH − SL. In
particular, SH and SL enter the two requirements detA > 0 and aHH + aLL > 0
multiplicatively and additively, respectively.
In order to obtain our third result, note ﬁrst that
ξH ≡
∂WH
∂β = α (1−K) (SH − So)
ξL ≡
∂WL
∂β = α (1−K) (SL − So)
Based on our second result, we only know that ξH and ξL have opposite signs.
We can now write " ∂ΓH
∂yL∂ΓL
∂yL
#
= −
"
aHH aHL
aLH aLL
#−1
·
"
ξH
ξL
#
=
"
aHL·ξL−aLL·ξH
detA
aLH ·ξH−aHH ·ξL
detA
#
.
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The results obtained above show that aij − ajj < 0 for all i = H,L and j 6= i.
Since ξH and ξL are of opposite signs and since aij−ajj has an ambiguous sign, we
can not use these results to determine how the individuals respond to increased
intergroup interaction.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a large population of individuals who choose between
engaging in crime and working. When individuals are concerned with their social
status, we ﬁnd that increasing crime will, in most cases, reduce the net social
status loss associated with being arrested. This induces the possibility of multiple
equilibria, even within a simple activity choice model. Also, we ﬁnd that in stable
equilibria increasing punishment reduces crime when the all individuals have the
same ability. Moreover, when the society is comprised of two ability groups,
whether social status is determined within a group or among the two groups
causes our results to change. In particular, unlike earlier models, we show that it
is possible that increasing punishment may increase crime. It is also possible for
the higher earning ability group to have more crime than the low ability group, if
social status is determined within a group.
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